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Signal Detection Theory (SDT; Wickens,
2002) is a prominent measurement model
that characterizes observed classification
responses in terms of discriminability and
response bias. In recent years, SDT has
been increasingly applied within the psy-
chology of reasoning (Rotello and Heit,
2009; Dube et al., 2010; Heit and Rotello,
2010, 2014; Trippas et al., 2013). SDT
assumes that different stimulus types (e.g.,
valid and invalid syllogisms) are associated
with different (presumably Gaussian) evi-
dence or argument-strength distributions.
Responses (e.g., “Valid” and “Invalid”) are
produced by comparing the argument-
strength of each syllogism with a set of
established response criteria (Figure 1A).
The response profile associated to each
stimulus type can be represented as
a Receiver Operating Charateristics
(ROC) function by plotting perfor-
mance pairs (i.e., hits and false-alarms)
along different response criteria, which
Gaussian SDT predicts to be curvilinear
(Figure 1B).
Trippas et al. (2014; henceforth
THVRME) applied SDT to causal-
conditional reasoning and make two
points: (1) that SDT provides an
informative characterization of data from
a reasoning experiment with two orthog-
onal factors such as believability and
argument validity; (2) that an inspection
of the shape of causal-conditional ROCs
provides insights on the suitability of nor-
mative theories with the consequence to
consider affirmation and denial problems
separately.
The goal of this comment is to make
two counterarguments: First, to point
out that the SDT model is often unable
to provide an informative characteriza-
tion of data in designs as discussed by
THVRME as it fails to unambiguously
separate argument strength and response
bias. THVRME’s conclusion that “believ-
ability had no effect on accuracy [. . .] but
seemed to affect response bias” (p. 4) solely
hinge on arbitrary assumptions. Second,
that THVRME’s reliance on ROC shape
to justify a separation between affirmation
and denial problems is unnecessary and
misguided.
1. SEPARATING ARGUMENT
STRENGTH AND RESPONSE BIAS
Assume a toy SDTmodel with four (equal-
variance) evidence distributions, corre-
sponding to the four types of syllogisms
resulting from the Validity (V = Valid/I =
Invalid) × Believability (B = Believable/U
= Unbelievable) factorial design. Now,
let the means of the distributions be
given by the main effects of Validity and
Believability as well as their interaction,
using a 0/1 factor coding. This factorial
design produces the table in Figure 1C.
The possibility of specifying different
response criteria for the two levels of the
Believability factor leads to an uniden-
tifiable SDT model in which differences
between means trade-off with differences
between response criteria (Wickens and
Hirshman, 2000; Klauer and Kellen, 2011).
For example, the ROCs in Figure 1D can
be equally accounted for by a differ-
ence in the distributions (Figure 1E) or
by a response-criteria shift (Figure 1F).
Because THVRME and others fix IB to 0
a priori, they enforce a response-criteria
shift interpretation of the ROCs. This
ambiguity in the characterization of the
data compromises the attempt to relate its
parameters with different accounts on e.g.,
the belief-bias effect. THVRME briefly
mention this (see their Footnote 2) but
do not address its implications. The IB
= 0 restriction implies that effects of
believability on argument strength can
only be detected if the interaction term
is non-zero as the main-effect term of
believability is effectively censored. This
means that a pure criteria-shift account
can be enforced as long as no severe vio-
lations of additivity (i.e., an interaction)
are observed. In other words, only when
VB differs from VU (while assuming IB
= 0) can the proposed pure criteria-shift
model be rejected. To make matter worse,
the criteria-shift account is implausible to
begin with given that it runs counter to
empirical work showing that individuals
do not tend to change their response cri-
teria on a trial-by-trial basis (e.g., Morrell
et al., 2002).
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FIGURE 1 | (A) A graphical representation of the SDT model for a syllogistic
reasoning task. (B) ROC curve representing the cumulative probabilities for
hypothetical pairs of hits and false-alarms (“valid” responses to valid and invalid
syllogisms, respectively) based on the four response categories depicted in
(A). (C) Factorial design of Believability×Validity representing themeans of the
SDT evidence distributions. (D) ROCs for believable and unbelievable
syllogisms. (E) Distribution shift account of ROCs in which the distributions for
believable syllogisms (solid lines) are shifted to the right. (F) Response-criteria
shift account of ROCs in which the response criteria for believable syllogisms
(solid lines) are shifted to the left. Note that for ease in the illustration the
response proportions implied by the SDT accounts of panels (E,F) do not
exactly correspond to the response proportions depicted in panel (D).
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2. DATA AGGREGATION CONFOUNDS
IN CAUSAL-CONDITIONAL
REASONING
THVRME’s reliance on ROC shape to
justify the separation between the affir-
mation and denial problems is unnec-
essary and misguided: It is unnecessary
because the acceptance rates (A) already
show the pattern AMP > ADA and AAC <
AMT1, indicating that performance is
“above chance” for affirmation problems
but “below chance” for denial problems
(see Singmann and Klauer, 2011, for simi-
lar results). This contrasting pattern in the
acceptance rates alone indicates that aggre-
gating affirmation and denial problems is
an unwise option. Note that the criticisms
associated to acceptance rates (e.g., Klauer
et al., 2000; Dube et al., 2010; Heit and
Rotello, 2014) do not hold here as they
are exclusively concerned with the inter-
pretation of response patterns of the form
AVB > AVU, AIB > AIU.
THVRME’s use of eyeball and
regression-based evaluations of ROC
shape is misguided because it overlooks
the more subtle (but still pernicious)
distortions from item heterogeneity
(Rouder and Lu, 2005), but also because
it fails to characterize SDT’s actual abil-
ity to fit their own data. As it turns
out, SDT fits the linear aggregate ROCs
better (VB/IB: G2(3) = 7.95, p = 0.05;
VU/IU: G2(3) = 10.63, p = 0.01) than
the curvilinear ROCs from acceptance and
denial problems (smallest G2(3) = 13.51,
p < 0.01). The sufferable fit of the aggre-
gate data is not surprising given Gaussian
SDT’s ability to account for near-linear
ROCs when performance is low2.
3. CONCLUSION
THVRME attempt to demonstrate the
value of SDT modeling in research on
causal-conditional reasoning. However,
1MP, Modus Ponens; MT, Modus Tollens; AC,
Afirmation of the Consequent; DA, Denial of the
Antecendent.
2 Note that a non-parametric characterization of
ROCs is possible (Kornbrot, 2006).
the main motivation for employing
SDT is to characterize differences in
argument-strength and response bias
across conditions. As we have shown,
the approach of THVRME is unable to
accomplish this in an unambiguous fash-
ion. Furthermore, THVRME’s detection
of differences between affirmation and
denial problems hinges on an evaluation
of ROC shape that is not only unneces-
sary (as acceptance rates are sufficient) but
also fails to relate ROCs with SDT predic-
tions in a principled way. SDT has a long
and successful history in psychological
research, and will likely provide impor-
tant insights in the reasoning domain;
however, from the current standpoint, we
fail to see the exact contribution of the
SDT modeling advocated by THVRME
and others (e.g., Dube et al., 2010; Trippas
et al., 2013; Heit and Rotello, 2014) to
research on human reasoning.
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